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ABSTRACT
Resilience to failures and deliberate attacks is becoming an es-
sential requirement in most communication networks today.
This also applies to P2P Overlays which on the one hand are
created on top of communication infrastructures, and therefore
are equally affected by failures of the underlying infrastructure,
but which on the other hand introduce new possibilities like the
creation of arbitrary links within the overlay.
In this article, we present a survey of strategies to improve re-
silience in communication networks as well as in P2P overlay
networks. Furthermore, our intention is to point out differences
and similarities in the resilience-enhancing measures for both
types of networks.
By revising some basic concepts from graph theory, we show
that many concepts for communication networks are based on
well-known graph-theoretical problems. Especially, some me-
thods for the construction of protection paths in advance of a
failure are based on very hard problems, indeed many of them
are in NP and can only be solved heuristically or on certain to-
pologies.
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P2P overlay networks evidently benefit from resilience-enhan-
cing strategies in the underlying communication infrastructure,
but beyond that, their specific properties pose the need for
more sophisticated mechanisms. The dynamic nature of peers
requires to take some precautions, like estimating the reliability
of peers, redundantly storing information, and provisioning a re-
liable routing.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the increasing dependence of our modern information so-
ciety on communication networks and distributed applications,
their correct functioning has become essential. However, com-
munication networks as well as overlay structures deployed on
top of them may suffer from random failures and/or become tar-
get of deliberate attacks. In this context, network resilience –
the ability to provide and maintain an acceptable service level in
the presence of (random or deliberate) failures – becomes
more and more important. A resilient network should be able to
cope with a specific amount of failures by remaining completely
functional, providing connectivity to all of its parts and providing
enough capacity to fulfill its task.
Nevertheless, resilience alone is not sufficient without keeping
efficiency in mind, which requires to use all network resources
in an efficient manner. Resilience measures usually introduce
redundancy into the system, which leads to a decreased effi-
ciency. The more resilient a system should be, the more redun-
dancy has to be applied, and the more the efficiency of the sys-
tem is decreased. So, there is a trade-off between the two goals
and both have to be taken into account when designing a resil-
ient infrastructure.
A networked IT-infrastructure basically consists of connected
intermediate nodes, providing a transmission service, and end-
nodes, running distributed applications that make use of the
transmission service. In this context, errors can be classified
into structural failures, like the breakdown of links and nodes,
and transmission errors. The latter category is out of the scope
of this survey, since measures against transmission errors have
already been extensively studied in literature, e.g. simple re-
transmission methods like ARQ or redundancy introducing co-
des like FEC [23] or turbo codes [9].
The handling of structural failures requires more complex
measures and is the main subject of this survey. Consequences
of node or link failures can be packet loss, delayed packets and
even partitioning of the network. Packet loss is the result of bro-
ken paths, delayed packets are caused by possibly necessary
re-routings, and if too many links fail, the network can be di-
vided into two or several isolated parts.
Different applications have different requirements towards net-
work resilience, which can be even contrary to each other. Some
applications need a strict timely delivery but may tolerate some
loss (e.g. multimedia applications like video streaming), whereas
some applications rely on the completeness of delivery without
specific timing requirements (e.g. file sharing). So, resilience re-
quirements might be different, depending on the application to
be supported. Nevertheless, in order to be able to give a com-
prehensive overview, this article aims at resilience at a more
general level, without a detailed view on specific applications.
In order to achieve resilience, the possibility for detection of fai-
lures and their correction is needed. For detection of a failure,
some additional effort has to be spend, e.g. periodical heart-
beat messages to be sure that a neighbor is alive. After a failure
is detected, means for correction have to be provided.
Resilience can be achieved either reactively by restoration or
pro-actively by protection methods. Restoration, requires a re-
action only upon the occurrence of an error. Protection, in con-
trast prepares means of correction through additional redun-
dant information before a failure occurs, and often does not
even need retransmissions. Therefore, protection usually provi-
des much faster error recovery than restoration, however, requi-
ring more overhead. According to [62], protection and restora-
tion methods usually apply the following steps:
1. Failure Detection
2. Failure Localization (and Isolation)
3. Failure Notification
4. Recovery (Protection or Restoration)
5. Reversion (Normalization)
Failure Detection is performed by standard mechanisms in rou-
ting protocols, as well as Failure Localization and Isolation, and
Failure Notification. More interesting is Recovery, which is the
main objective of this article. Our survey aims to provide an
overview of current recovery approaches to increase resilience
in communication networks, as well as in P2P overlay net-
works. The Reversion in the last step, is done by standard me-
chanisms again and is therefore not treated in detail neither.
Furthermore, we relate the approaches to known concepts of
graph theory, and also try to show interactions, similarities and
differences between approaches for communication networks
and P2P networks.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: in Section 2,
background on important graph properties and possible graph
classes in communication networks is given. Section 3
presents recovery concepts in infrastructure networks, classi-
fied into restoration and protection methods. In Section 4, re-
silience-enhancing methods for P2P overlay networks are
presented and differences to communication networks are
identified. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main findings of
the article.
2. Graph theoretical background
Any network can be modeled as a (directed) graph G consisting
of vertices or nodes V and edges or links E. Edges may be
weighted, to either represent communication capacities, or
communication costs or delays. This abstract view offers the
possibility to study characteristics measuring aspects of resil-
ience, which itself has a very informal and unspecific definition
so far. It is also possible to identify certain classes of graphs,
showing typical properties in respect to such measures.
Graph theoretic aspects mostly influence the design of protec-
tive mechanisms, but can also support restoration.
2.1 Important graph properties
Resilience was defined as the ability to maintain a network ser-
vice under interference. Since many of these services depend
on the reachability of nodes, connectivity measures certainly
belong to the most important graph properties.
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The edge connectivity λ and the vertex connectivity κ are
the minimum number of edges (vertices), that need to fail, to
separate the graph into at least 2 components and hence are
worst-case statistics of resilience. Alternatively interpreted, λ–1
and κ–1 are the number of edges (vertices) which may always
be removed, without disconnecting the graph. The edge con-
nectivity equals the size of an (unweighted) minimum cut of the
graph and is bounded from above by the minimum degree (i.e.
the minimum number of incident edges) of a vertex.
Due to the min-cut-max-flow theorem [35], λ also equals the
minimum number of edge-disjoint paths between any two verti-
ces in G, and κ is the minimum number of vertex-disjoint paths
between any pair of vertices, that are not directly linked by an
edge (the latter ones obviously can not be separated by re-
moval of a third vertex). Exactly these edge- or vertex-disjoint
paths are a key factor in the protection against structural fail-
ures (see Section 3.2).
A graph is called k-edge-connected if λ ≥ k, i.e. between every
pair of vertices exist at least k edge-disjoint paths. Similar it is
called k-vertex-connected if κ ≥ k, i.e. between every pair of
unconnected vertices there exist at least k vertex-disjoint
paths. Edge connectivity augmentation algorithms like [38, 8]
can be used to compute the minimum set of additional edges,
required to make a graph k-connected. Additionally, the union
of k edge-disjoint spanning trees, will result in a k-connected
graph, since it is a packing of k paths for every vertex pair. For
the augmentation of the vertex connectivity, only algorithms
with a running time exponential in the target connectivity are
known so far [46].
In the above form, the edge and vertex connectivity are a
measure for the resilience of a network against partition, i.e. the
minimum number of edges or vertices which have to fail in order
to disconnect pairs of vertices. But in many situations, even de-
creasing the communication capacity between two vertices un-
der a specific value, without disconnecting them completely, is
considered a failure. In these cases, it is possible to assign ca-
pacities to the edges and the edge-connectivity λ is the mini-
mum sum of capacities of edges crossing a cut (ie. a partition
of the vertex set). As in the unweighted case, the min-cut-max-
flow theorem ensures, that at least communication capacity c is
available between two arbitrary vertices, if the network satisfies
λ ≥ c.
Another connectivity related measure is the fragmentation of a
graph. Since, very often the disconnection of a single weakly
connected vertex is of minor importance for the whole network,
the fragmentation determines a value pair describing the size
and relation of its disconnected components. Let s1,…,sc be the
number of vertices in the c components of the graph, then the
value 
frag1 := 
is the relative size of the largest component and the value 
frag2 := 
represents the average size of the remaining components. Fol-
lowing the discussion above, values near 1 (which is high for
frag1 and low for frag2) are often seen as advantageous, de-
pending on the type of network service.
If the network services are dependent on short communication
paths, especially if delays play a role, a second set of statistics,
besides the connectivity metrics, becomes important. There-
fore, the degradation behaviour of distance metrics under incre-
asing damage should be studied. Furthermore, these metrics
allow the evaluation of scalability of communication within cer-
tain topology classes.
The shortest path between two vertices s and t is a set of edges
connecting s and t (possibly via intermediate vertices) and ha-
ving a minimum sum of edge weights. Let the distance d(s,t) be
the weight of the shortest s-t-path and the distance between
unconnected vertices defined to be infinite. The diameter of a
graph diam(G): = maxs,t ∈ V d(s,t) then is the length of the lon-
gest shortest path between any two vertices. Clearly, the dia-
meter influences the time of information distribution in the
whole network.
To get a better view on the whole network, it is also interesting
to study the average distance
d: =  Σs,t ∈ V d(s,t)
i.e. the average length of the shortest path between two ver-
tices of G. However, since this measure jumps to infinity as
soon as the graph becomes disconnected, it can be more inte-
resting to look at the average connected distance d^  regar-
ding only the paths between connected vertices.
When studying overlay networks, we are also interested in the
local properties of the graph. The clustering coefficient c(v) of
a vertex v, as introduced by [103], is the fraction of pairs of
Fig. 1 In a) a graph with edge connectivity 3 is given. In b) a graph with 
vertex connectivity 2 is shown.
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neighbors of v, which are neighbors themselves. Averaging this
value gives the clustering coefficient of the whole graph:
C(G) =  Σv∈V c(v)
One effect of a high clustering coefficient is the tendency to
high edge and vertex connectivities. Since many of the neigh-
bors are connected to each other, one has to remove quite a lot
of edges to disconnect its neighborhood. Similar, close vertices
tend to have a large common neighborhood, leading to a high
vertex connectivity. There is a multitude of further robustness
measures for graphs and this section can only present a most
important subset. For a thorough study, the reader is referred to
[12]. The next section will introduce important graph classes
guaranteeing certain limits for the above mentioned properties.
As can be seen, clustering and short distances may, but need
not, occur together.
2.2 Graph classes of communication networks
Depending on their properties and influenced by underlying
building mechanisms, graphs can be categorized into certain
classes. Choosing a graph class for the own (overlay) network
is one of the most important network design decisions determi-
ning resilience and efficiency.
A graph class both simple and easy to construct are the ran-
dom graphs, where the probability for two vertices to be di-
rectly connected to each other is uniform. In many peer-to-peer
environments this is often modified by requiring a constant out-
going vertex degree k, such that new vertices receive a list of k
other vertices to connect to, chosen uniformly at random. Assu-
ming unit edge-weights, connected random graphs show a low
(i.e. logarithmic in the number of vertices) diameter [21] and
have a very small clustering coefficient. Due to the expected re-
gularity and the lack of vertices with an outstanding role for the
connectivity, they suffer low damage from malicious attacks.
More precisely, these attacks have basically the same effect as
random node failures: With increasing damage, the network
first keeps connected for a long time and then fragments into
many small components [5]. The edge- and vertex connectivity
of random graphs is with high probability equal to the minimum
degree.
Another very popular graph class are power-law networks
[7]. Their properties appear in social and environmental net-
works as well as the Internet. They are characterized by a po-
wer-law distribution of vertex degrees. As Barabasi and Albert
have shown, such a property can be reached with the prefe-
rential attachment model: Starting with a small clique of initial
vertices, new vertices are iteratively added. During this pro-
cess, each new vertex is connected to k already existing no-
des, chosen with a probability proportional to their current ver-
tex degree.
Hence, a small number of nodes have a very high degree, lie on
many paths and act as important ‘hub’ nodes. On the other
hand, there are numerous unimportant vertices with low de-
gree. Power-law networks also tend to provide logarithmic dia-
meters. However, the uneven distribution of importance dictates
their resilience properties: while being highly robust to random
node failure, they heavily suffer from malicious attacks since a
systematic removal of the hub nodes leads to a fast fragmenta-
tion into many relatively small components and quickly increa-
ses the average connected distance [5] (which later rapidly
drops, since no more large components exist).
A random vertex removal especially shows good fragmentation
behaviour by maintaining one large component for a long time.
Another problem, not to be underestimated in peer-to-peer en-
vironments with limited resources, are the very high degrees of
some nodes.
Finally, a class which is highly relevant for peer-to-peer struc-
tures are the small-world networks [103]. They combine a
high clustering coefficient with a logarithmic diameter due to
long-range ‘shortcut’ edges. In that, they offer efficient commu-
nication together with a local common neighborhood. This
combination supports the ability to make global routing deci-
sions based on local knowledge [49] and enables groups of
vertices to locally cooperate, e.g. with tit-for-tat mechanisms.
Furthermore, the highly clustered neighborhoods and ability
for decentralized routing stimulate local and cooperative resto-
ration mechanisms. The definition of small-world networks in-
cludes very different graphs (especially, certain power-law net-
works too), such that high connectivity and a bounded node
degrees have to be enforced by appropriate building mecha-
nisms.
These characteristics are generated by e.g. the Watts-Strogatz
model: Beginning with a ring, first connect each vertex to all
vertices within distance d on the ring, for some d ≥ ln(n) / 2.
After that, rewire each edge randomly with small, nonzero pro-
bability p. If an edge is rewired, one of its vertices is exchanged
with a uniformly chosen other vertex. Similar ring structures
with shortcuts are often found in structured overlay networks
(e.g. Chord [95]). Consequently, these networks show the typi-
cal small-world behaviour.
2.3 Routing
The existence of one or more paths between two vertices does
not yet control, how a unit of information is eventually forwarded
between them. To be able to account for such a concept, we de-
fine routing.
In general a routing on a graph G = (V,E) is a map R: V × V →
Paths(G), from the set of ordered pairs of vertices to the set
Paths(G) of paths in G, such that R(u,v) is a path from u to v. It
is reasonable, to assume that for every vertex v the path R(v,v)
has length 0. A partial routing is a partial map R from a subset
of V × V to Paths(G). Routings modeled by this definition are
static. Dynamic routings can be formalized by several modifica-
tions. First, one can introduce time and consider a sequence of
routings Rt, one for each point of time. Hence, we have a con-
Fig. 2 Vertex u has a cluster coefficient of 0, vertex v one of 1/3 and w 
has cluster coefficient 2/3.
1
V
------
u v w
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stant routing at any point of time. This model may be used for
adaptive routing algorithms. Secondly, one can assign a proba-
bility distribution of the paths from u to v to each pair (u,v), lea-
ding to a probabilistic version of routings.
A local routing assigns a map Rv : V \ v → {(v,x) ∈ E |x ∈ V} to
each vertex v, assigning an edge leaving v to each other vertex.
The local routings of all vertices form a path for every vertex
pair (v,w) ∈ V × V as follows: starting in v, apply the local routing
of the current vertex to determine an edge to a next vertex and
proceed until either w or an already visited vertex is reached.
The set of all those paths is the routing of the graph. Of course,
this routing may be faulty, since it is not ensured, that the target
vertex is reached by this process. To avoid this, often a proba-
bilistic or non-deterministic component is added to local rou-
tings.
Assuming mutual reachability of all vertices and the fact, that for
every vertex u on the routing path from v to w, the v-u-path is a
prefix of the v-w-path, combining all paths starting at v results
in a spanning tree of the graph. This spanning tree is called
routing tree of v. This naturally leads to the notion of a tree-
based routing R: V → SpanTree(G) onto the set SpanTree(G)
of spanning trees of G.
3 GENERAL RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE-ENHANCING 
STRATEGIES IN NETWORKING
Resilience in networks is needed to guarantee a proper quality
of service in the presence of node and link failures as well as
transmission errors. However, the remainder of this article fo-
cusses on structural failures, while transmission errors are out
of the scope of this survey. As already mentioned in the intro-
duction, resilience-enhancing measures can be classified into
Restoration and Protection strategies. In the following Sec-
tion 3.1, reactive measures for error recovery after a failure has
occurred are discussed, and Section 3.2 revises proactive me-
chanisms which apply effort before a failure occurs.
3.1 Restoration
Restoration mechanisms are reactive and hence applied after
failure. For this reason, they offer a higher flexibility to react on
failures than protection mechanisms, which are proactive. Fur-
thermore, effort is only caused after a failure has happened,
whereas protection causes effort in every case.
Most of the standard routing mechanisms contain restoration
methods, in order to be able to react to link- or node failures.
Failures are detected and the routing re-converges, excluding
the failed element. Nevertheless, this takes some time and at
this point data loss may occur. Hence, this approach is not suf-
ficient for sensitive applications that rely on low or bounded de-
lays.
A faster way for restoration can be provided by a rerouting
around structural failures until the routing mechanism has re-
converged. Therefore, alternative routes are established ad hoc
and data is locally rerouted.
The Equal Cost Multipath (ECMP) option, which is used in inte-
rior gateway protocols (e.g. OSPF [67]), can be used to distri-
bute traffic via several alternative paths with equal costs to its
destination. Similar to ECMP, when several alternative paths
are available by the routing itself, a Shortest Path Rerouting
(SPR) can be used.
Beyond, the establishment of a new MPLS path [82], after the
failure, provides a method for restoration. Yet another approach
in packet switched networks is based on IP Fast Reroute [90]
and uses “not-via addresses” [60], to exclude a failed element
from the data path.
3.2 Protection
In order to protect infrastructure networks against structural fai-
lures like node outages or cut links, fallback solutions have to
be provided. The straight forward approach to increase the res-
ilience of a transmission infrastructure is to choose a redundant
layout by introducing multiple connectivity or multi-homing and
hence create a network rather than a simple spanning tree over
all nodes, thus allowing for a connectivity between nodes in
case of link-failures. Further approaches to increase the robust-
ness towards failing nodes or links can consist of redundantly
deployed hardware, by safeguarding every router through ano-
ther one, operating in hot standby, and multiple connectivity
between each pair of nodes. The resource demand of these so-
lutions is expensive and they are only feasible for extremely
sensitive applications. However, as networks, due to their mul-
tiple connectivity, show an inherent redundancy in their connec-
tions, virtual fallback solutions can be provided by computing
node- or link-disjoint paths between any pair of nodes, thus cre-
ating alternative routings. These solutions can be grouped into
three classes:
1. alternative global routings
2. locally alternative routings
3. bypass topologies
Alternative global routings are selected in exchange for the ini-
tial routing in case of failure [41, 44, 45, 64], so that the path is
switched from end-to-end and means for signalling the occur-
rence of a failure in the network are needed. In an alternative
approach [65] the differing paths of the alternative routings are
used in parallel. In case of a failure on a path it is avoided and
data is sent along remaining paths only. The minimum spanning
structures that may be used for alternative global routings are
spanning trees. A result of Nash-Williams guarantees, that k
edge-disjoint spanning trees can be found in an undirected net-
work of edge-connectivity 2k [68].
Locally alternative routings [36, 44, 51, 52] only concern local
neighborhoods and are selected in case of the breakdown of a
component, in order to circumvent the failure. Basically a locally
alternative routing requires the existence of at least two node
disjoint paths connecting the two communicating nodes.
Hence, a sufficiently high vertex-connectivity is required.
In order to create a detour around failures, the third class of ap-
proaches [42] creates an additional routing topology, which can
be used to quickly create alternative routes around failed compo-
nents. In the following examples of this type, usually a spanning
or dominating subgraph of connectivity 2 or more is used. Here
spanning means, that every vertex is member of the subgraph,
while a subgraph dominates the graph, if every vertex has a dis-
tance of at most 1 to the vertices in the dominating subgraph.
Based on the classification given above, in the following approa-
ches known from various types of networks are presented.
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Nevertheless, these concepts can be applied to other networks,
too.
Linear Automatic Protection Switching
Linear Automatic Protection Switching (APS) can be classified
as alternative global routing for the protection of a path end-to-
end and distributes data redundantly via two bidirectional chan-
nels, in order to offer the highest possible protection. The bidi-
rectional channels represent two node- and link-disjoint paths
in the network.
Linear APS is part of SONET/SDH [41] and is usually used for
high sensitive applications. In packet switched networks a de-
ployment based on MPLS [91, 74] is possible.
Self-Protecting Multi-paths
Self-Protecting Multi-paths (SPM) [65] are a method intended
to protect paths end-to-end by an alternative global routing. The
main idea is to provide k node-disjoint (and hence link-disjoint)
paths, whereby the network has to be k-vertex-connected, ie.
κ ≥ k (cmp. Section 2.1). Traffic is distributed via all k paths by a
load balancing function like an equal distribution of traffic to all
possible paths. In case of a failure, the affected packets are
simply shifted to another remaining path.
Since the k node-disjoint paths have to be pre-computed, we
run into the Maximum Disjoint Path Problem, which is known to
be NP-complete [39, 92]. If the paths are only required to be
edge-disjoint, they can be constructed in polynomial time, using
standard maximum-flow algorithms.
As stated in [65] a realization of SPM in an IP network can be
done by manipulating the link costs in the OSPF-protocol [67]
or by using MPLS [91] together with the MPLS Fast Rerouting
mechanism [74].
Protection Rings
A Protection ring offers alternative global routing protection.
The construction of a ring requires to establish a path, which
traverses all nodes only once. Thereby, one structural failure
can be recovered. For enhanced protection multiple rings can
be deployed to counter more than one node or link failure.
In an Unidirectional Path Switched Ring (UPSR) two redundant
copies of protected traffic are sent in both directions of the ring,
whereas in Bidirectional Line Switched Ring (BLSR) traffic is re-
routed in the other direction in the case of a structural failure on
the ring.
Such a protection ring is a Hamiltonian cycle, which is one of
the classical NP-complete problems [39]. Consequently, this
technique may only be applied, if the network has a special
structure, like for example an artificially added Hamiltonian cy-
cle.
Examples for the appliance of Protection Rings are circuit swit-
ched networks, like SONET/SDH [41]. In [66] three approaches
for ring construction in such networks are given. In packet-swit-
ched networks a pre-computed ring can be used for protection
by a rerouting based on [91, 74, 90, 53].
Redundant Trees
Redundant Trees [64] establish an alternative global routing in
the network, by the creation of link-disjoint spanning trees. In
addition to the main routing tree of all nodes, a second alterna-
tive routing tree is established as a backup. They can be ap-
plied to every protocol that allows the use of redundancy for the
protection from failures and the establishment of tree routing.
Even though the approach is based on a centralized algorithm,
the authors briefly propose means for a distributed computa-
tion.
Tree construction starts at a common source vertex s for all
trees and tries to include all vertices in the network. In doing so,
all constructed trees have to be link-disjoint. Fig. 3 shows an ex-
ample deployment, which allows to tolerate both node and link
failures. The thin arrows indicate the primary distribution tree,
whereas the fat arrows indicate the backup distribution tree. In
case of structural failures on the path of the primary tree, the al-
ternative path in the secondary tree can be chosen for data de-
livery.
Again, a result of Nash-Williams, guarantees, the existence of k
edge-disjoint spanning trees if the network is 2k-edge-connec-
ted [68]. In [83] Roskind and Tarjan described a polynomial time
algorithm for the construction of k edge-disjoint spanning
trees.1
A deployment of Redundant Trees for protection in IP networks
is described in [22], but can also be done by using the IP Fast
Reroute Mechanism [90], by Failure Inferencing-based Fast
Rerouting [53] or by MPLS Fast Reroute [74].
Resilient Routing Layers
Resilient Routing Layers (RRLs) [44, 51] represent another ap-
proach that creates alternative routings. The main idea of RRLs
is to find fully connected spanning subgraphs of a given topo-
logy, which are labelled layers. All different layers in conse-
quence have to contain all nodes and a subset of the links, but
need not necessarily be link-disjoint. In addition, there is the re-
striction that every node v has to be a leaf, ie. connected to only
one neighbor, in at least one of the layers. These layers are
called safe for v. So, v experiences no transit traffic destined for
other nodes, except traffic to the connected one.
Fig. 3 Two trees for the protection against a vertex failure.
1 In fact they compute k spanning trees with total minimum weight.
Primary Tree
Backup Tree
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Under normal circumstances and without the occurrence of an
error, ordinary routing across the whole topology (and all links)
takes place. As soon as a node failure occurs, the traffic is
routed according the safe layer of the failed node. In the pres-
ence of link failures, several cases have to be differentiated,
whereby we will call the incident node, which formerly received
traffic from the broken link, the downstream node: If the
downstream node is not the traffic destination and the broken
link is not its safe link, the safe layer of the downstream node is
used. Otherwise, the detecting (upstream) node sends on its
own safe layer, if the broken link is not its safe link. If this is ad-
ditionally the case, it switches the packet to its safe layer as
well, however, using another outgoing link, hence, taking ad-
vantage of the fact, that its safe layer will not route any traffic
back to it.
Note, that the worst-case number of recoverable failures is hea-
vily dependent on the connectivity of the subgraph induced by
combining all routing layers. Consequently, although the links of
different routing layers do not need to be link-disjoint, such a
provision is strongly recommended. Furthermore, for a reaso-
nable application, the underlying graph should have at least a
vertex connectivity of two, in order to find enough distinct layers.
So, RRLs are no option in sparsely connected topologies.
Fig. 4a) shows an example topology in which two different rou-
ting layers are established as shown in 4b) and 4c). In Fig. 4b)
nodes 1, 2, 3 and 5 are safe, whereas they are transit nodes
and therefore not safe in Fig. 4c). A failure of one of them in 4c)
would disrupt several paths.
In Fig. 4d) data is sent from 6 to 3 and traverses the nodes 4
and 5, as indicated by the solid lines besides the topology links.
After the failure of node 5, global and local recovery methods
are possible. In local recovery (dashed lines) no explicit signali-
sation of the failure to the other nodes is needed. The adjacent
node to the failure just switches onto the layer in which node 5
was safe and forwards the traffic. In our example, node 4 swit-
ches the traffic to the second layer via node 7. In global reco-
very the failure is signalled in the network and the nodes may
chose more optimal routes based on this information. In 4d)
node 4 signals the failure to 6, which switches to another layer
and forwards the traffic via 7. A similar approach by the same
authors was proposed in [52]. In this publication they describe
an improved and faster algorithm for the creation of layers.
RRLs can be created in connectionless IP networks by marking
every packet according to the layer of the selected routing, as
well as in connection-oriented networks based on MPLS. As al-
ready mentioned for the previously described approaches, a
deployment in packet switched networks can be done accor-
ding several mechanisms [91, 74, 90, 53].
Protection Cycles
Protection Cycles [36] are basically a Cycle Double Cover
(CDC) with additional properties. A CDC is a family of cycles,
such that every edge of the graph is in exactly two of them. Fur-
thermore, the cycles of the CDC have to be orientable (OCDC),
such that every edge occurs in both possible directions.
Protection Cycles were firstly proposed for optical networks
and require a topology with at least two parallel uni-directional
working channels, one in each direction, and two parallel
backup channels. In case of a failure at a working channel, the
reverse backup path is used for rerouting traffic in the reverse
direction.
In case of a failure of edge e, the packets destined for forwar-
ding via e, may be redirected along the remainder of the corre-
sponding cycle, containing e in the reverse direction. An edge
connectivity of at least two is required, to find a protection cycle
for every vertex.
On general 2-edge-connected graphs, the existence of a CDC
is far from clear. But it is known that the minimum counter-
example for graphs having no CDC has to be of a very specific
type. Hence, it is strongly conjectured, that every graph con-
tains a CDC. For details, the interested reader is referred to
[36], where a heuristic algorithm for the construction of an
OCDC can be found.
Each time a link fails, exactly two protection cycles are involved
– one for each direction along the failed link. The failure of an
additional link on one of these cycles can not be recovered,
since the alternative route is already destroyed. Hence, in the
worst case only one link failure can be recovered. But in the
best case, every link failure damages two still intact protection
cycles. Therefore, if s protection cycles are known, we can
handle at most s/2 link failures.
On 2-connected planar graphs, OCDCs are known to exist. In
this situation the existence of faces provides a way to construct
it.
In an Eulerian graph a cycle exists that traverses every link
exactly once. Therewith, it is the counterpart of Hamiltonian
rings, which traverse all nodes only once. An Eulerian cycle can
be split up in edge-disjoint cycles, resulting in an OCDC, by
simply orienting these in both directions. If it exists, an Eulerian
Fig. 4 In a) a topology is shown from which two example Resilient 
Routing Layers b),c) are built. In d) node 5 failed, which can be 
handled by global (dotted lines) or local recovery (dashed lines) 
for the original data path from 6 to 3 (solid lines besides topology 
links).
1 2 3
6 7 8
4 5
1 2 3
6 7 8
4 5
1 2 3
6 7 8
4 5
a) b)
c)
1 2 3
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4 5
d)Data Path
Local Recovery
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cycle can be computed in polynomial time, eg. [37]. As with
Protection Rings, the main appliance of Protection Cycles are
circuit switched optical networks. Therefore, in [36] also imple-
mentation details are given. Furthermore, Protection Cycles
can be used to counter node failures, but it is usually out of
scope in optical networks.
An appliance to IP networks is possible on the basis of [91, 74,
90, 53] and a suitable topology that corresponds to the one in
an optical network according [36].
p-Cycles
Pre-configured Cycles (p-Cycles), were firstly proposed in [42]
for the protection of optical networks and are similar to Protec-
tion Cycles. The authors in [41] showed that p-Cycles have bet-
ter properties than Protection Cycles in terms of capacity red-
undancy, application domain and the conceptual basis. Never-
theless, in [45] it is shown that p-Cycles are a more general
concept and Protection Cycles can be derived as a limiting
case.   
A p-Cycle itself is nothing more than a precomputed logical ring
of nodes, protecting against the failure of links incident to two
ring nodes (thus not only protecting the links of the ring). In
case of a link failure, the adjacent node marks the traffic with its
routing distance to the destination and sends it along one intact
path on the cycle. The encapsulated packets travel on the p-Cy-
cle until they traverse a node that has a shorter routing distance
towards the original destination address (thereby preventing
loops). This node decapsulates the traffic and forwards it follo-
wing the normal routing of the network.
Fig. 6a) shows an example. Since p-Cycles have to be com-
puted in advance, they are a protection scheme and can be
classified as a bypass topology in which a detour around
structural failures is provided by rerouting the traffic on the cy-
cle.
In Fig. 6b) a link on the cycle fails and only the remaining direc-
tion is left for restoration. In Fig. 6c) a straddling link fails re-
spectively. In this case two directions on the ring remain for re-
storation and it is even possible to split the traffic in both direc-
tions.
To protect the whole network, either the p-Cycle should be a
Hamiltonian cycle, containing all nodes, or a combination of
multiple p-Cycles has to be used. Note, that the computation of
a Hamiltonian cycle is an NP-complete problem and therefore,
the same applies to the more generalized problem of finding a
minimum number of cycles, such that for each edge there exists
a cycle either containing the edge itself or both end nodes.
For the protection against vertex failures, the concept has to
be extended to node-encircling p-Cycles [93]. As soon as a
node fails, an adjacent node routing traffic over it does not
know the second-next hop, since the adjacent node has no ac-
cess to the routing information of the failed node. Further-
more, it does not even know whether the node two hops away
is part of the p-Cycle and can be reached via the reverse di-
rection. Hence, to protect from the failure of a node v and to
provide restoration for all possible flows, this node v has to be
surrounded by a p-Cycle containing all its direct neighbors in
the topology, but not v itself.
To protect the whole network, every node is surrounded by
one encircling p-Cycle. To ease deployment, it is also pos-
sible to apply the weaker concept of region-encircling protec-
tion, by encircling all nodes within a certain region. Fig. 6d)
shows an example. Node X is surrounded by a p-Cycle cre-
ated from adjacent nodes A,B,C and non-adjacent node D
since a ring consisting of only the set of adjacent nodes is not
possible.
p-Cycles can be applied in various transmission technologies,
like optical networks (WDM, DWDM), networks based on vir-
tual connections (e.g. MPLS, GMPLS) or packet-switching
[93]. Particularly, in the latter ones, techniques like virtual cir-
cuit-like IP tunneling or label switching, e.g. based on MPLS
[82], can be applied. p-Cycles can be used in multi-layer net-
works, like in IP-over-DWDM, and can be even applied in dif-
ferent layers simultaneously. For the creation of p-Cycles, a
centralized configuration as well as distributed algorithms
[101] are possible.
Fig. 5 Protection Cycles in a planar graph.
Fig. 6 In a) a topology with an example p-Cycle is given. Dashed lines 
indicate ordinary links and solid lines indicate links used for the p-
Cycle. b) shows the failure of an on-cycle link and c) one of a 
straddling link. In d) another topology with an node-encircling p-
Cycle is given in order to protect from a failure of node X.
A D
X
B C
a) b)
c) d)
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Table 1 shows a summary of all presented protection schemes,
according their class, the underlying graph theoretical problem
and the origin of the approach.
Tab. 1 Comparison of Protection Schemes
4 RESILIENCE IN P2P OVERLAY NETWORKS
Peer-to-Peer is a system architecture that describes a service
which is distributed over multiple nodes or processes. While in
a client-server architecture the roles are predefined, all partici-
pants generally act as both a client and a server in P2P sys-
tems. As these participants usually consist of end-hosts, their
behaviour, arrival, and departure is not well predictable, and
possibly very dynamic.
A common service to all P2P systems is the lookup of informa-
tion, be it a data resource that is published by another partici-
pant or information on existence and addresses of other partici-
pants. Here, the communication between peers consists of
pairs of requests and replies: a requesting peer takes the role
of a client and the requested peer the role of a server. If a re-
quested peer is not able to perform this service, it delegates the
request to another peer, thus forwarding the request to a peer
that stores the requested information. Additional services, like
the registration of information or the distribution of content are
commonly implemented on top, in order to create applications.
In order to be able to request information and to route requests
in case of the need for delegation, all participants select one or
multiple neighbors, thus creating an overlay. Since, due to the
dynamic character and the potential size of these overlays,
peers can only gather information about a subset of other
peers, the main challenge in peer-to-peer systems is to suc-
cessfully locate information, i.e. to reliably route requests th-
rough the overlay to peers that are able to provide the reques-
ted information.
Since an overlay network is a network structure built on top of
the communication service of an underlying network, special
resilience requirements evolve independently from the resili-
ence of both networks seen alone. To study such effects, it is
once more helpful to use the terms of graph theory: An overlay
of a graph O = (V,E) on a communication network C = (Ν,L) is
a pair M = (MV ,ME) consisting of a map MV : V → N of the
overlay nodes to nodes of the communication network and a
map ME : E → Paths(C), such that ME(u,v) is a path in C from
MV(u) to MV(v).
At first view, this definition enforces specific paths on the under-
lying communication network, and hence a partial routing RM
on C. However, overlays on the application layer usually have
no direct influence on the routing of the communication network
C. This case is covered, too: assume, that there exists a map
MV : V → N, and a routing R on C. Then we can define the map
ME : V → Paths(C), by setting ME(u,v) = R(MV(u),MV(v)).
Hence, our formal model also covers the case, in which the rou-
ting is induced by the underlying communication network C.
A mapping of the overlay, which consists of end-to-end connec-
tions onto the underlying communication network is characteri-
zed by its congestion and dilation (sometimes also called path-
stretch): The congestion Κ of a graph embedding M is defined
as the maximum number of overlay paths traversing an edge of
the communication network, i.e. K(M) := maxl∈L|{e ∈ E | l ∈
ME(e)}|. This notion of congestion corresponds to the notion of
congestion in communication networks, in the sense, that an
edge with a high congestion, tends to be used by a higher num-
ber of packets, than edges of low congestion, implying a high
risk of communication congestion.
The dilation D of an embedding M is the maximum number of
edges in any communication path induced by an overlay edge,
i.e. D(M) := maxe∈E|ME(e)|.
As the failure of a single communication edge will lead to the
breakdown of multiple overlay links, and furthermore, band-
width exhaustion could appear on the congested edge, high
congestion can cause serious problems for the application. Si-
milarly, a high dilation leads to increased communication delays
and a higher failure probability of the overlay link, because it is
dependent on multiple elements of the underlying network.
Since, usually, the mapping of overlay nodes to communication
network nodes cannot be influenced, the only possibility for op-
timizations lies in considering the underlying communication to-
pology when constructing overlay edges. This includes the ad-
dition of edges in the overlay graph O, allowing alternative rou-
tings in the underlying network, which may be used to reduce
congestion as well as dilation, and may lead to more efficient
communication paths.
The main challenge that arises from the decentralized charac-
ter of peer-to-peer systems is the distribution of the service to
end-hosts rather than to dedicated servers and routers. The
highly dynamic character of these end-hosts in comparison to
dedicated servers requires peer-to-peer systems to take pre-
cautions in order to provide a reliable service. These can be
classified by their goals into approaches to
– gain an estimation of the reliability of peers
– provide a reliable routing of requests through
– redundancy in connectivity, information storage or mes-
saging.
– imposing a structure on the overlay.
4.1 Estimation of reliability
While clients that request a service from a dedicated server will
usually trust the entity that provides the resources for the server
due to knowledge, which is external to the system, this implicit
credibility does not exist in peer-to-peer systems. A similar lack
of dedicated resources holds for the forwarding: while in com-
munication networks the roles of routers, as a reliable infra-
Attributes
Concept Class Related Graph 
Problems
Origin Refer-
ences
Linear APS global Maximum Disjoint Paths optical [41]
SPM global Maximum Disjoint Paths IP/MPLS [65]
Protection 
Rings
global Hamiltonian Cycle optical [41]
Redundant 
Trees
global k-Spanning Tree IP [64]
RRL global/
local
– IP [44, 51]
Protection 
Cycles
local Orientable Cycle 
Double Cover
optical [36]
p-Cycles bypass Hamiltonian Cycle optical [42]
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structure for path selection and forwarding, and end-hosts,
which run application level processes, are generally well distin-
guishable, possibly very unreliable end-hosts have to perform
the tasks of routing and forwarding in overlays. Hence, as peers
rely on the cooperation of each other, both for delegating re-
quests and performing the information lookup, notions of relia-
bility and trustworthiness are especially relevant in this environ-
ment.
Estimations of the reliability of peers can either be obtained im-
plicitly by analyzing and monitoring basic attributes of peers, or
explicitly through the introduction of the notion of a local image
or distributed reputation of peers.
Analyzing Peer’s Attributes
Depending on the application that is implemented on top of the
overlay, a good estimation of the behaviour and the quality of
service provided by a peer can be obtained through analysing
simple attributes like the time of presence and the available re-
sources. A frequently cited study to model user behavior in
filesharing systems [87] has shown that the probability of a
peer’s departure decreases with increasing time of presence in
the overlay. This study has led to a preferential connection to
nodes with high uptime in a multitude of systems [63, 58, 14,
98]. Another characteristic shown by the same study is the
broad heterogeneity of nodes, which lead to the preference to
place information and to select neighbors, based on their re-
sources, thus balancing load for congestion avoidance in the
overlay [20, 69, 106, 98]. For implementations of Peer-to-Peer
streaming or application layer multicasting (ALM, [81]) this is a
natural approach and commonly used to decrease both delays
and (random) failure probability [76, 11]. However, it has to be
noted that this preferential attachment based on previously ob-
tained information, might also play into the hands of an attacker
deliberately choosing nodes to be attacked.
Reputation Systems
Increasing the resilience of peer-to-peer systems using reputa-
tion mechanisms has been proposed by different research
groups. The reputation can be useful for a more exact estima-
tion of the reliability of peers, their credibility and the accuracy
of their responses or even for the introduction of punishment of
uncooperative or malicious peers (good overviews and discus-
sions on this topic can be found in [86, 15, 54]).
In an early approach to implement a reputation mechanism in
peer-to-peer systems, the reputation information is stored in the
peer-to-peer system itself [2]. Later approaches save the repu-
tation of peers locally [27, 48, 33, 107, 70, 43].
An essential weakness of reputation systems in decentralized
systems is their vulnerability to sybil attacks and collusions [32]:
if votes of identities are collected in order to estimate the repu-
tation of a participant, a malicious party can always create mul-
tiple identities or form collusions in order to achieve a false, but
high reputation. However, certain constraints, design decisions
and the characteristic of the service on top of the overlay can
increase the robustness of reputation systems towards these
threats [31, 84]. Levine et al. [54] define four classes of soluti-
ons to the sybil attack: a) by proof of Douceur, the only solution
to inhibit sybil attacks is trusted certification using a central cer-
tification authority that checks the exact identity of each partici-
pant2; b) a weak protection is the testing of resources (IP
address of identities); c) imposing recurring cost in the form of
computational cost, real monetary cost or the demand for time
consuming interactions by users can hinder an attacker in cre-
ating a high amount of false votes; d) trusted hardware may be
used to distinguish between actual hardware devices.
4.2 Reliable Routing
The approaches to provide a reliable routing follow two parallel
strategies: the introduction of redundancy and of structure. Due
to the lack of global knowledge of both the existence of peers as
well as the structure of the overlay, straight forward methods of
creating global routings are impossible. Local routings can still
be established and the probability of successfully routing mes-
sages to requested peers can be increased through the intro-
duction of redundance:
– Redundant connectivity allows for message transmission
and the delegation of requests, even if some links or neigh-
boring peers fail.
– Redundant data storage allows for the retrieval of data, even
if the primary service providing peer fails or is overloaded.
– Sending redundant requests increases the possibility to suc-
cessfully find routes to one or different peers that can pro-
vide the requested service.
To further increase the routing reliability in a highly dynamic
overlay of unknown topology, some structure can be imposed
on the overlay, as all peers agree on a common namespace,
usually consisting of large random identifiers, and common pro-
cedures to create and use the overlay for message delegation.
4.2.1 Introducing Redundancy
Methods that allow to deal with the failure of peers which are
expected to forward or serve requests in the overlay, again, are
based on redundancy. Due to their dynamic characteristic, they
comprise of redundant data storage and redundant requesting
on top of creating a redundant layout of the overlay network.
Redundant Connectivity
Very similar to the approach of setting up a multiple connectivity
in communication networks (cmp. Section 3.2), peers in over-
lays commonly select a multitude of neighbors. Comparing to
the redundant connections in communication networks, the ad-
ditional links come at a very low cost: as it can be assumed, that
all nodes in a peer-to-peer system via the underlying communi-
cation network can mutually open a connection to each other,
the overlay is merely a subset of links of a clique graph that con-
tains all nodes and establishing another link in the overlay does
not explicitly imply monetary investment. However, creation and
maintenance of links require bandwidth and storage resources,
as messaging overhead is needed and the state of the overlay
has to be kept. This redundant neighbor selection leads to the
possibility to both route requests on short paths and to be able
to quickly establish a functional local routing in case of structu-
ral failures.
2 Automatic threshold certification authorities are no solution in this case, as
they in general are unable to tell if a request is authentic or the attempt to
generate sybil identities. Hence, external checks are necessary.
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Most peer-to-peer approaches apply this strategy of pro-ac-
tively saving information on possible neighbors for fallback.
However, some systems select multiple neighbors only for
means of successful routing (e.g. CAN [78] explicitly removes
information on nodes, which are no direct neighbors).
Redundant Data Storage
A strategy to ensure the location of data is the replication of the
lookup service (rather than providing redundant means for the
transmission service by introducing multiple connectivity),
which leads to a redundant storage of information. This ap-
proach is frequently used in conventional client-server based
data retrieval services like DNS or webservers, and can also be
applied in peer-to-peer systems: In order to be able to retrieve
information even after some peers have failed, data is replica-
ted and stored redundantly on different peers.
As a common application on top of the plain routing surrogate
of peer-to-peer networks is the storage, retrieval or distribution
of data sets, this approach is naturally extended to these appli-
cations. Different replication techniques can be distinguished
by their data allocation, i.e. the way that peers for the redundant
storage are selected.
In some systems [50, 24, 28, 59, 4, 98], the location for the re-
plica is rather random and not explicitly chosen. Hence, data
may be implicitly replicated by peers who formerly requested it,
by random registration messages or the like. In Freenet [24], for
example, data is replicated by a random subset of the peers,
that forward it on the path from the replying node back to the re-
questing peer. The number of replicas of data in consequence
depends on its popularity and frequently requested information
is replicated with higher probability than information that is rarely
requested.
Other approaches implement a deterministic allocation of the
replicas, in order to aid their discovery at the time of request
delegation. A straight forward strategy for deterministic alloca-
tion is the replication on a given number of neighboring nodes
in the overlay that is implemented by large number of peer-to-
peer substrates [85, 63, 94] and peer-to-peer applications [34,
29, 77]. Since in case of the failure of a service providing peer,
the message may still be delegated to one of its previous
neighbors, which are now able to provide the requested ser-
vice. A slight modification of this approach is to select a num-
ber of nodes to be responsible for a certain subgroup of ser-
vices. In PGrid [1] disjoint sets of nodes are selected to pro-
vide a fragment of the services, with all nodes of the set repli-
cating the services of each other. A different approach of
deterministic allocation is followed by [79, 96], which explicitly
choose replicating peers by predetermined mappings. This
leads to a higher resilience to correlated failures and the pos-
sibility to locate the services on shorter paths through the
overlay.
The replication of data again leads to the problem of choosing
reliable peers and ensuring its integrity. This is especially rele-
vant for data storage and retrieval applications that are built on
top of peer-to-peer substrates, as in their case corruption of
data due to errors does not only lead to a temporary unavaila-
bility, but a complete break down of the service. Corruption due
to adversarial behaviour could even worse lead to the user trus-
ting in data that has been tampered with. Solutions to this pro-
blem comprise of reputation systems as presented in 4.1
(wuala3, [61]), and probabilistic as well as deterministic verifica-
tion. While probabilistic verification [40, 57, 71, 47, 6] only pro-
vides a proof of the integrity of parts of the replicated data, de-
termistic approaches [13, 30, 89, 72] allow for the verification of
the complete data at each replicating node.
Redundant Requesting
Redundant requesting is the third type of redundancy that helps
to increase the reliability of routing in peer-to-peer systems.
Message loss and local routing breakdowns due to link or node
failures, but also faulty routing due to loops or local optima can
cause an unsuccessful delegation of requests. As peer-to-peer
systems do not have a notion of a connection between a re-
questing and a serving peer, these failures can not easily be
detected. However, the probability of such incidences can be
drastically decreased, by sending multiple requests in parallel,
thus reaching the same peer on different paths, or a replication
of the requested service.
A straight forward approach to redundant requesting is boun-
ded or global flooding of requests [25, 98]. Requests are sent
and forwarded to all neighboring, except the requesting peer.
Using unbounded flooding, every node that is still connected to
the network in consequence will receive the message at least
once. As unbounded flooding is inefficient and leads to an im-
mense messaging overhead, different improvements have
been proposed. Introducing identifiers for the messages and
keeping the state of previous searches, and thus avoiding to
flood messages multiple times at the same forwarding node,
decreases the amount of redundant messages in the overlay.
Flooding additionally can be bounded to a preset horizon, by in-
troducing an IP-like time-to-live (TTL) for each message, which
then is dropped, after the TTL has expired [98]. Bounding the
flooding may decrease the quality of the routing, as it may sig-
nificantly reduce the fraction of nodes to which the request is
forwarded and it hence might not reach a node that is able to
deliver the service, as it is behind the search horizon, i.e. exter-
nal to the flooded subgraph of overlay [105]. Increasing the
search horizon in case of unsuccessful searches is a viable
countermeasure, which, however, may lead to a high message
load in the case that a requested information actually is not
available in the overlay.
In order to further decrease the amount of redundant messages
other approaches propose to perform random walks [3, 59, 88,
26] by replicating the message only at the original source of the
request and subsequently forwarding it to random neighbors at
all requested peers. Thus, too, local optima and faulty routing
due to structural failures can be circumvented, while keeping
the amount of redundant requests low.
Random walks however lead to higher response times. Further-
more, their success rate heavily depends on the graph on which
they are conducted. Usually, a thorough analysis can only be
made for specific graph models, like random graphs or some
small-world networks (e.g. [49]). In most applications, one has
to rely on experimental results.
In systems that replicate services and perform deterministic al-
location [79, 96], redundant requests can additionally be
routed to one of the replicas. This not only yields an increased
reliability due to the ability to tolerate the failure of the node that
3 http://www.wua.la/
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originally offered the requested service, but may additionally
lead to the possibility to select a replica which can be accessed
on a short path through the overlay.
The strategy of redundant requesting has another flavour with
respect to the application: Applications that implement a con-
tent distribution scheme, and especially in case of applications
that can tolerate a low rate of lost messages (like conferencing,
live streaming or video-on-demand services), setting up redun-
dant paths, that comprise of no or only a few common forwar-
ding nodes can significantly decrease the perceived loss due to
failures and thus increase the quality of service [18, 96, 97, 55,
99, 73, 80].
4.2.2 Imposing Structure on Overlays
Being able to estimate the reliability of peers and increasing the
resilience through different types of redundancy, overlays are at
this point perceived as a potentially big graph of unknown topo-
logy, spanning a potentially large set of unknown nodes that are
connected through unknown links. Imposing structure on the
overlays is an orthogonal approach, that aims at providing the
possibility to implement a deterministic routing and to achieve a
predictable performance of lookups. Overlays can be structured
by different policies of neighbor selection on two levels by:
– creating an overlay of a virtual but deterministic topology,
and
– optimizing an overlay topology to exhibit desirable characte-
ristics.
Structured Overlays
In order to provide means for the implementation of a determi-
nistic routing scheme on the one hand, or in order to be able to
achieve highly successful lookups with low delays using sto-
chastic routing schemes on the other hand, different approa-
ches propose to impose different virtual structures on the over-
lay. These approaches follow one of the three main ideas of a)
creating an overlay that resembles a random graph, b) introdu-
cing a hierarchy into the previously flat overlay and allocating
different roles to nodes, according to their level, or c) making
use of the id-space of the nodes and thus implementing a dis-
tributed hashtable by organizing all nodes in a predefined over-
lay structure.
By creating an overlay, which resembles a random graph and
by implementing a replication of information at a preset fraction
of completely random nodes, [98] achieves a very high resili-
ence to malfunctions of nodes caused by both failures or at-
tacks, as well as a high reliability due to probabilistic “guaran-
tees”.
Another way to reduce the routing complexity and thus achieve
a higher reliability of the lookup is to introduce a hierarchy and
allocate roles to the peers accordingly. Hierarchical approaches
(fasttrack4, edonkey5 [50]) by different means select a subset of
all peers as “super nodes” or “super peers”, which provide the
lookup and routing to the rest of the peers. The super nodes
again request and delegate requests by routing in an unstructu-
red network between each other, while the peers of the lower
level simply locate one or a set of super nodes and use them in
a conventional client-server fashion. This hierarchy leads to a
much lower load for the big share of low-level nodes and a
much smaller subgraph in which requests are delegated.
Distributed Hashtables (DHT)
DHTs are the third strategy that imposes a structure on the
overlay. A namespace is divided and mapped onto overlay
nodes, so that every request is routed towards a node, that has
the responsibility for the registration of the area corresponding
to the request. The mapping between namespace and nodes is
done by a computable function (e.g. a hash function). So, in ad-
dition to their underlay address, nodes usually chose an identi-
fier, which can be easily mapped on the identifiers of the pro-
vided resources or corresponds to them. In addition, a registra-
tion mapping between resources and node identifiers is done,
which is based on a distance value. The node, whose node
identifier is numerically closest to the resource identifier, stores
the resource and all references to replicas of the resource.
The identifiers of nodes are not directly addressable in the net-
work, so the choice of neighbors and the routing have to be ad-
apted towards the namespace. This requires to create a virtual
structure above the namespace, that can be a ring [95], a tree
[85, 63, 110, 75] or a torus [78]. A routing in these structures re-
quires all nodes to chose their neighbors according the applied
virtual structure. Lookups or requests for a specific identifier are
routed along the structure towards the responsible node hol-
ding the specific registration area in the namespace.
Depending on the chosen structure, upper bounds for the num-
ber of hops that are required to route a request can be given. In
ring structures the upper bound is at O(n), whereas for balan-
ced d-ary tree structures with d ≥ 2 the bound is at O(log n). For
a d-dimensional torus the upper bound lies at O(d × n1/d).
Overlay Characteristics
In addition, to the chosen structure of the namespace, an over-
lay can also be categorized by other properties. An important
characteristic is the locality-awareness of the overlay. Overlay
nodes can be arbitrarily connected to other overlay nodes, com-
pletely independent of the underlying infrastructure network. In
this case neighboring nodes in the overlay need not necessarily
be neighbors in the underlay and may be located in a high dis-
tance from each other, which increases the probability of a fai-
lure as the path consists of a high number of comparably unre-
liable nodes. In a locality-aware overlay the information of
neighborhood and routing topology of the underlay is taken into
account for the overlay construction. The path stretch, or dila-
tion, is a good metric for the quality of the location awareness of
an overlay network. A good overview of P2P substrates that fol-
low this approach is given in [17] and specific approaches can
be found in [108, 109, 16, 104]. Including locality information in
overlay construction is no direct measure to improve resilience.
Nevertheless, it shortens overlay paths, lowers end-to-end la-
tency and consequently decreases the failure probability and
the traffic load in the underlying communication networks.
Another property of overlays is the power-law characteristic as
described in Section 2.2. In power-law networks, short overlay
paths may be established, since most of the traffic is directed
mostly via a few highly connected nodes. The power-law cha-
4 http://developer.berlios.de/projects/gift-fasttrack/
5 http://www.emule-project.net/, http://www.amule.org/
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racteristic increases the resilience of a network against random
failures, since the probability of the failure of a node with a high
number of neighbors is low. However, due to the central role of
these highly connected hubs, power-law networks unfortuna-
tely are more vulnerable to targeted attacks. Approaches that
attempt to create overlays with a power-law character are [3,
88, 96].
Small World, as described in Section 2.2, is a property of net-
works (e.g. the Internet), which contain short paths between all
node pairs. Small-world networks are sparsely connected net-
works with a huge number of nodes, a low average path stretch
and a high clustering coefficient. In many of these networks the
degrees are distributed by a power-law, usually causing the low
diameter. In the context of overlay networks various approa-
ches exist that attempt to create overlays with small world pro-
perties [95, 85, 102, 96]. In addition, these systems can be
classified into approaches that focus on the provision of short
paths [100, 11, 10, 96], a group of approaches that create in-
ner-node disjoint paths for improved resilience [19, 97, 56, 96],
and approaches that attempt to balance the relevance of peers
in the network [96] in order to be more resilient against atta-
ckers aiming to interrupt the service of highly relevant nodes.
5 SUMMARY
In this article, we surveyed various concepts for improving resil-
ience in communication networks as well as resilience-enhanc-
ing strategies and measures in P2P overlay networks. Regard-
ing recovery techniques for communication networks, we clas-
sified the current state-of-the-art into alternative global rout-
ings, alternative local routings and bypass topologies.
As we have seen, the improvement of the resilience of commu-
nication networks gives rise to several algorithmic challenges.
Especially the construction of alternative routings for the pro-
tection of the communication, often requires the solution of hard
problems and most times can only be achieved by heuristics or
on special topologies. Furthermore, most of the proposed stra-
tegies rely on high edge and/or vertex connectivity. More elabo-
rate metrics, as the fragmentation or the average distances pre-
sented in Section 2.1 have not yet been considered in approa-
ches for specific networking or P2P architectures.
P2P overlay networks, realized at application level, require the
transmission services of the underlying communication infra-
structure, and therefore both benefit from resilience-enhancing
measures in the underlying infrastructure. Nevertheless, the
specific properties of an P2P overlay network pose the need for
more sophisticated resilience-enhancing methods and goes
beyond simple rerouting techniques presented in Section 3.
We examined the key properties of P2P overlays that influence
resilience without an in-depth view of application specific de-
tails, since there is wide variety of different applications employ-
ing P2P overlay techniques. A file-sharing application, for ex-
ample, has other specific demands and puts emphasis on other
methods than a multimedia application. One key property, re-
quired for all P2P overlays, is the ability to cope with a very dy-
namic membership, which requires some precautions to pro-
vide a reliable service. Measures for improved resilience can be
classified in reliability estimations of peers and in the provision-
ing of a reliable routing. The latter one in turn can be estab-
lished based on redundancy in connectivity, information storage
or messaging and by imposing a structure on the overlay.
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